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Over a short period of time, the strengthening of law and governance
has become a major focus for international development organisations,
as well as for governments and organisations at the national level.
These are now devoting a substantial portion of development funds
into reform and capacity building programmes aimed at legal and ad-
ministrative institutions in transitional and developing countries.
However, the ‘building’ of legal and governance systems is proving to
be a dauntingly difficult and complex task and one in which the meth-
ods of approach are highly contested. It has been assumed that law
and governance reform is a technical, managerial and financial matter,
which allows for the export of laws and the transplantation of legal and
administrative structures. The disappointing results of such reforms
have illustrated, however, that not enough attention has been given to
how laws, policies, institutions and stakeholders operate in reality, in
their socio-political contexts. The uniqueness of individual countries,
sectors and institutions is often insufficiently understood, and the ac-
tual experiences with the myriad of law and governance programmes
and projects are not translated into knowledge on how law and govern-
ance reform promotes development.
In response, the Leiden University Press series on Law, Governance,
and Development brings together an interdisciplinary body of work
about the formation and functioning of systems of law and governance
in developing countries, and about interventions to strengthen them.
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at the national and international level, thus attempting to stimulate le-
gal reform for development.
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Outline
Traditional authority is a distinguishing feature in the landscape of
contemporary Africa. In many African countries, traditional leadership
remains important in organising the life of the people at the local level
despite modern state structures. Traditional leaders deliver essential
services that African states do not always succeed in delivering; they
act as intermediaries between the government and the local population;
and they are often a political force to reckon with, wielding enormous
electoral and general influence in their own communities due to their
control over resources and people.
After independence, many African governments saw chiefs as threats to
their power and impediments to modernisation and nation-building,
and tried to curtail their role in local government and national politics.
Despite these efforts, chieftaincy survived. And since the 1990s, African
governments, international institutions and donor organisations have
shown a renewed interest in it. As a result, a large number of African
countries have enhanced or formalised the position of their chiefs.
At the same time, however, the resurgence of traditional authority coin-
cides with the wave of democratisation that has rolled over sub-Saharan
Africa since the 1990s, and many question the desirability and legiti-
macy of traditional authority in modern forms of governance, and the
compatibility of traditional rule with the principles of democratic rule of
law.
To enable policymakers, academics, and donor institutions to critically
assess claims of the enhancement of the position of traditional authori-
ties, and the desirability of such moves, this Research & Policy Note will
discuss the following issues:
– What are traditional authorities, and which functions do they per-
form?
– Why do governments display a renewed interest in traditional
authorities?
– What are the effects of policies and laws regarding traditional
authorities on their tasks, power, independence, and local legiti-
macy? To what extent do these policies and laws change power con-
figurations and control over resources?
To understand the complex relationships between government and tra-
ditional authority, on the one hand, and between traditional leaders and
their people, on the other, an analytical framework is presented. This
framework consist of five questions regarding the actual functions,
powers, and position of chiefs to determine the legal, administrative
and political aspects of the position of traditional authorities vis-à-vis
the government and vis-à-vis their people.
In the last section, this Research & Policy Note will return to the ques-
tion of the legitimacy of traditional authority in democratic states, and
the desirability of enhancing its position. It proposes a ‘realistic ap-
proach’ to this issue, in which the performance of traditional authorities
is compared to the reality of elected (local) government in developing
countries – with all its problems of accountability, mismanagement,
and capacity – and not to how it is supposed to work in theory.
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1 What are Traditional Authorities?
Traditional authority is a characteristic feature in the landscape of
many modern African states. Traditional leaders perform a variety of
important functions regulated by customary law – including dispute
settlement, natural resource management, local development, and tra-
ditional religious tasks –, they often play a role in local or national poli-
tics, and they are in various ways linked to modern state structures.
But what or who are these traditional leaders?
Diversity marks the world of African traditional authorities. This di-
versity is partly due to differences in pre-colonial political structures,
and partly due to a range of colonial and post-colonial governmental
policies towards chieftaincy. Pre-colonial traditional societies covered a
whole range of political orders. At one extreme, some African societies
had extremely hierarchical, militarised forms of kinship or chieftaincy.
At the other extreme, many societies traditionally had no chiefs but
were loosely linked segmentary lineage systems. In the colonial period,
in some areas, the existing chiefs were ‘recognised’ by the various colo-
nial governments, whereas in other areas – areas without chiefs or with
chiefs that did not suit the colonial government involved – new ‘chiefs’
were imposed by the colonial administration. In many areas, the colo-
nial government also invented or strengthened hierarchical relation-
ships – between different tribes and traditional authorities – that had
not existed or were still in flux before the period of colonial rule. They
integrated the chiefs into their administrative apparatus by placing
them between the local colonial administrators and the population.
“Diversity marks the world of African traditional authorities.
Pre-colonial traditional societies covered a whole range of
political orders. At one extreme, some African societies had
extremely hierarchical, militarised forms of kinship or
chieftaincy. At the other extreme, many societies traditionally
had no chiefs but were loosely linked segmentary lineage
systems.”
The colonial powers varied in their approach towards chieftaincy.
For instance, when comparing the British and the French adminis-
tration in colonial West Africa, it becomes obvious that the British
tried to install ‘legitimate’ traditional leaders who had fulfilled all
the traditional prerequisites for assumption of office. The French
were far less concerned with legitimacy than the British and took
a much more pragmatic approach towards the appointment of
chiefs. They balanced the traditional right to rule against the abil-
ity to administer in the modern sense, including the ability to
speak French. They also created administrative territories that often
did not match the boundaries of pre-colonial territorial units. How-
ever, in cases where the British did not find strong local chiefs or
a clear hierarchy among the various chieftaincies, they too were in-
clined to make ‘administrative appointments’ and create hierar-
chies. Also with regard to the functions of chiefs, the British and
French policy differed. This is represented in Box 1. It should be
noted, however, that policy and practice diverged in many cases.
Whilst the French and British had their distinct local administra-
tive policies, West Africa was far from being a tabula rasa on which
these could be imposed without reaction. In reality, there was less
choice than has often been assumed (Crowder 1978).
Box 1: Functions of French and British chiefs in colonial West Africa
French chiefs:
– lost their traditional functions of justice, policing the state, and of
administering the government of his people
– no official criminal jurisdiction over their subjects
– no ‘native authority’ of their own with a budget and control of ap-
pointments
– agents of the colonial administration, assigned to perform unpopu-
lar tasks such as the recruitment and supervision of forced labour,
the rounding up of soldiers for the army, and the collection of taxes.
British chiefs:
– ‘native authority’ of their own with a budget and control of appoint-
ments
– left to carry on local government with relatively little interference
from the colonial administration
– when interference was deemed necessary, the colonial political offi-
cers were careful to let it be seen that the resulting decision was
made by the chief
ð
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– these chiefs lost their sovereignty to the colonial overlords, but their
powers over their subjects increased because the traditional checks
and balances to the exercise of their authority were neutralised by
the same colonial authorities. This increase in power was the princi-
pal cause of the unpopularity of many chiefs in British West Africa
during the colonial era.
We can now go back to the question of what traditional authorities are.
The word ‘traditional’ seems to refer to the historic roots of leadership.
We have seen, however, that the current traditional leaders in Africa do
not all have pre-colonial roots. Instead of referring to historic roots,
‘traditional leadership’ in this Research & Policy Note refers to leader-
ship whose legitimacy is rooted in history – either real or invented –
and culture, often combined with religious, divine or sacred references.
In the course of this Research & Policy Note, I will use ‘traditional
authorities’, ‘traditional leaders’, and ‘chiefs’ synonymously. These
terms can denote kings, spiritual leaders, elders, heads of extended fa-
milies, and other local ‘big men’.
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2 The Changing Attitude of African Governments
After the attainment of independence, the attitude of African govern-
ments towards traditional leadership varied, although none can be con-
sidered overly positive. Some countries, such as Guinea, Uganda and
Tanzania, ventured to formally abolish traditional leadership. Other
countries entered a path to curtail chiefs’ powers. For instance, the first
independent government of Ghana, headed by President Kwame Nkru-
mah, abolished the formal judicial function of the chiefs and tried to
break their economic power base by depriving them of any role in land
management and eventually of ownership and their claims to have the
right to collect land ‘rents’. The Botswana government in the first years
after independence transferred the responsibility for local health, edu-
cation and public works, the levy of local taxes, and the impounding of
stray stock from the chief and his tribal administration to the newly
created District Councils, and the right to allocate tribal land to execu-
tive tribunals, known as Land Boards. In both countries, the govern-
ment was given a final say in the selection and removal of chiefs. This
say in the determination of chiefly status could also be witnessed in
some other countries, such as in Togo during the regime of President
Gnassingbe Eyadema (1967-2005), who heavily interfered with the lo-
cal selection of chiefs and installed many of its own allies. In some
other African countries, chieftaincy was more or less ignored by the
state administration, left to its own devices, whether to thrive in the lo-
cality or to slowly wither away.
“After independence many African governments saw chiefs as
impediments to modernisation and nation-building and tried
to curtail their role in local government and national politics.
But since the 1990s, a large number of African countries have
enhanced or formalised the position of their chiefs.”
Although this was widely expected in the first decades of indepen-
dence, in most countries chieftaincy did not wither and die. Traditional
leaders often remained a political force to reckon with, for many of
them still wielded enormous electoral and general influence in their
own communities. This can be understood from the relation between
their control over resources and their control over people. In addition,
many postcolonial regimes have raised the position of particular chiefs
who were considered political allies, and gave chiefs places in the poli-
tical system as members of assemblies on different levels ranging from
local councils to national parliament. For instance, Houses of Chiefs
were created in Botswana – where it formed the upper chamber of the
National Assembly – and in Ghana – where it functioned as an inde-
pendent institution to advise the government on traditional matters. In
many countries, the chiefs held an important ‘intermediary position’,
between the government and the local population. On the one hand,
the government could reach the people through the chiefs. On the
other hand, the chiefs represented the local people at the government
and were a key for locals to enter the realm of public affairs. Chiefs re-
presented the national culture in the locality and the local culture in
dealing with members of the government at national and sub-national
levels.
After independence many African governments saw chiefs as im-
pediments to modernisation and nation-building and tried to curtail
their role in local government and national politics. But since the
1990s, a large number of African countries have enhanced or for-
malised the position of their chiefs, including Mozambique, Ugan-
da, Ghana and South Africa. Not only African governments, but
also international institutions and donor countries are displaying a
renewed interest in chieftaincy. Traditional leaders feature high on
the agenda of international fora. A case in point is the World
Bank’s ‘Promoting Partnerships with Traditional Authorities Project’
in Ghana (2003-2006). Under this project, the World Bank provided
a US$5 million grant directly to two traditional authorities in Gha-
na, the Asanteman Council and the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional
Council, bypassing the Ghanaian government. The project aimed to en-
hance the standards of health and education in the traditional areas,
and includes the goals of strengthening the capacities of traditional
authorities and upgrading the financial and management capabilities
of the traditional councils and their secretariats (World Bank 2003b).
Many African conferences also deal elaborately with the issue of tradi-
tional authorities, and delegations of traditional authorities are regu-
larly received by foreign governments or politicians on their travels
abroad. (Otumfuo Osei Tutu II Education Fund n.d. lists recent visits
by the Asantehene (Ghana)).
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Box 2: The changing position of chiefs in a number of African
countries
– Mozambique: The socialist Frelimo government banned chiefs
upon gaining its independence in 1975 and set up new governance
structures. Despite this, the chiefs continued to play an important
role in rural areas both during and after the war. In response, the
government in 2000 decreed the chiefs a role as state assistants
and community representatives. In 2002, a little over one thousand
chiefs were formally recognised as rural ‘community authorities’
and delegated an extensive list of state administrative tasks and ci-
vic-educative functions (Buur and Kyed 2005).
– Ghana: The Constitution of 1992 guarantees the institution of chief-
taincy and restricts the state from appointing or refusing to recog-
nise chiefs (article 270). The position of the chiefs is currently being
strengthened by the Land Administration Project, a donor spon-
sored, long-term programme which aims to enhance land manage-
ment in Ghana through the strengthening of customary land secre-
tariats under the aegis of traditional authorities. This is expected to
enhance the chiefs’ power over land and people (Alden Willy and
Hammond 2001; Ubink 2008; World Bank 2003a).
– Uganda: The powerful kingdom of Buganda, abolished by Uganda’s
1967 Constitution after the Buganda king had been exiled in 1966,
was restored to a certain extent in 1993 by President Museveni. In
1995, the Constitution was redrawn to recognise the institution of
traditional leaders (Englebert 2002: 53; Herbst 2000; Ray 2003: 11).
– South Africa: Despite the negative role of traditional authorities dur-
ing the Apartheid period, South Africa has witnessed a surprising
continuation and even strengthening of traditional leaders’ formal
position in post-apartheid South Africa. After many hesitations, the
South African Parliament passed two pieces of legislation in 2003
that would give some degree of clarity about the position of tradi-
tional authorities in South Africa’s democracy: the Traditional Lea-
dership and Governance Framework Act (no. 41 of 2003) and the
Communal Land Rights Act (no. 11 of 2004). The first act provides
for the establishment and recognition of traditional councils. A ma-
jority of sixty percent of traditional council members consist of tra-
ditional authorities and their appointees. The second act provides
that these traditional councils will have unprecedented powers in
the area of land allocation and administration (Claassens 2006;
Ntsebeza 2003; 2005; Ntshona and Lahiff 2003; Oomen 2002).
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3 Explaining the Renewed Interest in Traditional
Authorities
It can be assumed that widespread criticism of the state administra-
tion is an important factor causing the renewed interest in chief-
taincy. In one argument, the resurgence of chieftaincy is connected to
notions of ‘failed states’, unsuccessful nation-building, and internal
conflicts and civil wars, and chiefs have filled the gap of absent gov-
ernments. They are seen as ‘the only remaining and functioning form
of social organisation’ (Lutz and Linder 2004: 4). Upon closer obser-
vation, however, it is revealed that the African continent displays a
surprising lack of any resurgence of tradition in failed states. Rather,
the revival of traditional authorities has taken place in countries with
a functioning state apparatus, alongside the establishment of compet-
ing local institutions in the form of democratically elected councils.
This can, for instance, be witnessed in South Africa, Uganda, Malawi,
and Ghana. In fact, states that are more confident in their own insti-
tutions and stability might be more likely than weak states to tolerate
the rise of alternative sources of authority, at least in the cultural
sphere or in areas of local land management and dispute settlement
(Englebert 2002: 57-8).
“States that are more confident in their own institutions and
stability might be more likely than weak states to tolerate
the rise of alternative sources of authority, at least in the
cultural sphere or in areas of local land management and
dispute settlement.”
But why would governments be interested in recognising or formalis-
ing the position of traditional leaders? First, chiefs are service provi-
ders, who perform a number of important functions in their localities.
Box 3 displays the main functions of chiefs. The renewed interest in
chieftaincy is linked to the understanding that traditional structures re-
main very important in organising the lives of the people at the local
level despite modern state structures. Since African states often have
not succeeded in delivering essential services, people keep turning to
traditional authorities. The government might recognise or formalise
the position of chiefs hoping to expand the number of functions or en-
hance the chiefs’ performance. Second, many African governments
would like to add the legitimacy of traditional leaders to that of elected
(local) government by giving traditional leaders an official role in gov-
ernmental institutions. They hope to strengthen the position of the
government by integrating tradition into the space of governmental
power as a symbolic, legitimising discourse. Third, chiefs are interme-
diaries, who take up a position in between the government and the lo-
cal population. By formalising the position of chiefs, the government
can hope to reach the people through their traditional leaders and ben-
efit from the mobilising potential of traditional authorities for develop-
mental and democratic projects that the state does not have the capa-
city to conduct by itself. Fourth, the government sometimes needs the
co-operation of chiefs to ‘capture local communities’ in order to achieve
legislative hegemony. Fifth, without taking traditional structures into
account, social and political engineering are likely to fail at the local le-
vel, as state measures meet resistance from reluctant or antagonistic
chiefs. ‘While chiefs cannot often oblige governments to take any posi-
tive action, throughout Africa they possess the power to hinder govern-
ment policies by showing – as discreetly as they wish – that they do
not favour popular co-operation’ (Ribot 2000). In sum, the main rea-
son to formalise and enhance the position of traditional leaders is to
improve local governance. In many countries, attempts at decentralisa-
tion that excludes traditional authorities have failed, and state policies
have not been implemented because chiefs have resisted them. Chiefs
are a social reality in many countries and governments have to recog-
nise the existing structures.
The resurgence of chieftaincy has been aided by the fact that new
public spaces for traditional leaders seem to have been opened up in
many African states by the adoption of multi-party democracy and
democratic decentralisation, and by the trend of considering the state
as just another actor in an increasingly complex and interwoven glo-
bal order. In a comparable way, the liberalisation policies of the
1990s and donor calls for structural adjustment, emphasising a smal-
ler state, cuts in public expenditure, a strengthening of civil society,
and alternative dispute resolution, created an increased space for the
involvement of traditional authorities in law enforcement, dispute re-
solution, service provision, and the implementation of development
projects. Added to this, the enlarged distance between people and the
state facilitated the resurgence of tradition as an alternative mode of
identification.
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Box 3: Main functions of traditional leaders
– Dispute resolution by traditional leaders in customary courts is said
to be popular and often resorted to as it is easily accessible, cheap,
fast, and comprehensible. For instance, in 1997, customary courts
in Botswana tried about 75 or 80% of the criminal and civil cases in
the country (Sharma 1997: 41). More recently, (neo-)traditional
courts are also envisaged to play a role in the trial and reconcilia-
tion process after violent conflicts such as the genocide in Rwanda
and the armed rebellion of the Lord’s Resistance Army in North
Uganda.
– Traditional authorities also have a role to play in the field of natural
resource management. They are thought to be able to ensure nature
conservation and environmental equilibrium and to manage cus-
tomary land in such a way as to ensure general and equitable ac-
cess to land and to guarantee the social security function of land.
– Chiefs should promote community development programmes. Tradi-
tional authorities are often seen as having the capacity to mobilise
their people behind development initiatives and to be able to use
the authority and respect from their people for community educa-
tion and awareness creation. Combined with the intimate knowl-
edge they possess of their areas, this pleads for the inclusion of
chiefs in community development processes.
– Traditional leaders often function as an intermediary between local ci-
tizens and government. Donors, aid agencies, and governments of-
ten look upon traditional authorities as the missing link between
rural citizens and the state. On the one hand, they are able to im-
plement governmental law and policy and to facilitate, explain, and
attain popular support for development projects in their traditional
area, on the other hand, they can provide information from the lo-
cality.
– Traditional leadership is seen as a channel that can articulate the
needs and priorities of communities, which it represents, and this can
lead to genuine democratisation and development and the asser-
tion of local autonomy against the globalising and modernising
power of the state.
– In performing all these functions, traditional leadership is also ex-
pected to protect local culture, tradition, identity, and religion.
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4 The Current Position of Traditional Authorities
We have seen that central governments often envisage a role for tradi-
tional leaders in issues of local administration. At the same time, how-
ever, they may view traditional leaders as a threat. When governments
see traditional leaders as a force undermining their own power, they
may attempt to turn chiefs from more or less independent local actors
into mere agents of the state. On the one hand, this includes a co-opta-
tion through bureaucratisation of chiefs in order for the government to
benefit from the functions chiefs perform in their communities and to
exploit the control they exercise over people and resources. On the
other hand this includes a plan to marginalise chiefs. What is pre-
sented as a recognition by the state or a strengthening of the role and
position of traditional leaders, may in fact be a co-optation and may re-
duce the role of chiefs to helping legitimise state policies without being
given real and independent power. In such cases, chiefs are not an al-
ternative to the state, but rather a particular manifestation of state in-
tervention in the localities. While integrating traditional leaders politi-
cally and administratively into central government, and utilising tradi-
tion as a symbolic, legitimising resource for governmental power, they
simultaneously attempt to ‘folklorise’ the traditional side of the chiefs’
role (Von Trotha 1996: 87-88). In such cases, the resurgence of chief-
taincy will not significantly change power configurations and the distri-
bution of resources.
As noted earlier, not all African governments regard traditional lea-
ders as a threat. Especially in countries where an emerging or existing
class alliance between traditional and modern elite can be found, there
might be less hesitation to allow for independent local administration
by chiefs or to even enhance the position and power base of traditional
authorities. Such an alliance can, for instance, be found in Ghana,
where there was considerable friction between the modernist elite and
the elderly chiefs at the end of the colonial period and the first decades
of independence, but this discord largely disappeared with the trend of
selecting highly educated men as chiefs. Currently, modern and tradi-
tional leaders largely originate from one elite group and chiefs are of-
ten family members and former classmates of ministers, sub-minis-
ters, high civil servants, etc., or even take up such positions them-
selves. And indeed, in line with the above hypothesis that such coun-
tries might be more willing to actually strengthen the position of
chiefs, the position of traditional authorities in Ghana is currently
being strengthened.
Governmental policy towards traditional leadership – whether in-
formed by fear or friendship – has a bearing on the relationship be-
tween traditional leaders and their people. The power of traditional lea-
ders is often based on two sources: state recognition and local ‘tradi-
tion’. Formal recognition of chiefs can enhance their local power and
legitimacy, but might as well endanger those qualities, especially when
the legitimacy of the government itself is being questioned. When
chiefs are heavily integrated into the administrative apparatus and tied
to the national political structure dominated by the interest of the head
of state and the ruling national party, this can have a detrimental effect
on their local position. The local attachment of the chief can to a cer-
tain extent give way to his responsibilities as a member of the central
administration and his loyalty towards the national government and
the politics of the national centre can come to dominate (Von Trotha
1996: 87). This happened, for instance, during the colonial period, and
led to a decline in responsiveness to local needs, local accountability
and the functioning of the existing local checks and balances. In the
same vein, local checks and balances on chiefly administration can be
enhanced by governmental interference but may as easily be eroded by
governmental action or a lack thereof.
“The power of traditional leaders is often based on two
sources: state recognition and local ‘tradition’.”
To understand the complex relationships between the government
and traditional authority, on the one hand, and between traditional
leaders and their people, on the other, an analytical framework is
needed. Such a framework will enable researchers, policymakers and
donor institutions to critically assess claims of enhancement of the
position of traditional authorities, and the desirability of such moves.
Box 4 presents a simple analytical framework. It consists of five ques-
tions regarding the actual functions, powers, and position of chiefs.
These questions, which are elaborated below, are grouped according
to (1) questions regarding the position of traditional authorities vis-a`-
vis the government (legal, administrative and political aspects) and
(2) questions regarding the position of traditional leaders vis-a`-vis
their people.
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Box 4: Factors determining the position of traditional authorities with-
in African states
– Their legal position: Does national law recognise and guarantee the
position of traditional authorities? Does national law provide the
government with influence on the selection of chiefs?
– Their administrative position in the governmental apparatus: To what
extent do chiefs perform functions for the government and how are
these tasks regulated? Are chiefs on the government’s payroll? Can
they perform their tasks independently or are they circumscribed
and monitored by the state? Do traditional leaders depend finan-
cially and administratively on the state? How do they relate to
elected local government bodies?
– Their role in national politics: What linkages exist between chiefs and
modern state structures? Are traditional leaders allowed to partake
in party politics, and if so what role do they play in this field?
– Their legal and administrative position in the community: What tasks
do chiefs perform in their community, and how do they perform
them? How are these tasks and the performance of chiefs in gener-
al regulated in the traditional system?
– Their social position in the community: To what extent are people at-
tached to traditional structures, values and norms? How popular
and legitimate are the chiefs in their localities? Is the institution of
chieftaincy being debated?
4.1 The position of traditional authorities vis-a`-vis the government
Question 1: What is the legal position of traditional authorities?
Sub-questions: Is the position of traditional leaders recognised and guaran-
teed in the constitution or other state law? Is the selection of chiefs a purely
local affair or does the national government have a say in the process?
Formal recognition of the institution of traditional authority by the
state is likely to transform the position and legitimacy of traditional lea-
ders. On the one hand, it strengthens their position vis-a`-vis the gov-
ernment. On the other hand, the possible negative impact of formal re-
cognition is that they may lose their independence and risk being iden-
tified with state failure. State influence on the selection of individual
candidates affects their independence even more. An additional effect
is that the government will become implicated in local struggles for
chieftaincy positions, which are rife in many countries and often lead
to violent popular uprisings.
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Box 5: The legal position of traditional authorities in Ghana and
Botswana
The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992) guarantees the insti-
tution of chieftaincy, and states that Parliament has no power to enact
a law which ‘confers on any person or authority the right to accord or
withdraw recognition to or from a chief for any purpose whatsoever’
(Article 270). This same document defines a chief as ‘a person, who,
hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly no-
minated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as
a chief or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary
law and usage’ (Article 277).
In Botswana, chieftaincy is recognised, but not independent. Section
4 of the Chieftainship Act (Act 19 of 1987) states that a chief is an in-
dividual who (a) has been designated as a chief in accordance with
customary law by his tribe, and (b) has been recognised as a chief by
the Minister of Local Government. The Minister can withdraw recogni-
tion at any time when he considers this to be in the public interest.
Any chief who fails to comply with any direction given to him by the
Minister is liable to be suspended or deposed (section 18).
Question 2: What is the administrative position of traditional leaders in
the governmental apparatus?
Sub-questions: Does the state define and control the powers and functions
of the traditional leaders? To what extent do they perform functions for
the government and how are these tasks regulated? Does the government
allow for independent local administration? Do traditional leaders function
alongside elected local government bodies, and do they have reserved seats
or advisory functions in those bodies? Are chiefs on the government’s pay-
roll? Do the traditional authorities depend financially and administratively
on the state?
Some of the main functions of chiefs lie in the realm of local adminis-
tration. These functions can result from their ‘original jurisdiction’ and
from governmental regulations and policies. Officially chiefs exert their
power ‘in the shadow of state law and administration’, but – to stay
within the proverbial idiom – the size and coolness of the shadow vary
considerably from one country to another. Some governments provide
mechanisms to carefully monitor chiefly performance, others leave this
up to the locality – either because of a lack of power or capacity to exe-
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cute such control, or because of an ideology that they should not or
need not interfere in local affairs. Administrative duties in the name of
the state can provide chiefs with additional power, but might also give
a chief the place of a low-placed office holder. The payment of a salary
to traditional leaders by the government enables them to discharge
their functions and maintain the status of their office. Additionally, the
provision of a salary could diminish the chiefs’ incentives for self-en-
richment or corruption in the discharge of their responsibilities and
for clinging to outdated customs, as long as those customs bring finan-
cial benefits. Payment of salary can also be seen as a way to transform
chiefs into civil servants, accountable to senior civil servants and sub-
ject to disciplinary sanction. Besides a salary, chiefs are sometimes al-
lowed to retain a percentage of the tax revenue they collect. However, if
traditional leaders are paid by the government, their role as local lea-
ders might be compromised. They might be seen as agents or even
tools of the central government.
“Some governments provide mechanisms to carefully monitor
chiefly performance, others leave this up to the locality –
either because of a lack of power or capacity to execute such
control, or because of an ideology that they should not or
need not interfere in local affairs.”
Box 6: The administrative position of traditional authorities in
Cameroon and Ghana
In Cameroon, Decree No. 77/245 of 1977 turned all traditional leaders
into auxiliaries of the government. The chiefs’ installation has to be rati-
fied by an express note of administrative recognition before he can offi-
cially exercise any active role. He is now accountable to the senior Divi-
sional Officer of his area and might suffer disciplinary sanction from
low level bureaucrats. In return, the chiefs receive a small monthly salary
from the state in addition to a small commission from tax collections.
This bureaucratisation of chieftaincy has demystified the sacred nature
of royalty and seriously curtailed the powers of the chiefs (Fisiy 1995).
ð
In Ghana, traditional leaders are not seen as agents of the govern-
ment. They do not perform tasks such as tax collection and registra-
tion of births and marriages and do not receive a state salary. They
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manage approximately seventy per cent of the land, and their position
as custodian of this land is recognised by the government. The law is
silent about the way they should perform this function, except for one
provision: article 267(1) states that they should manage the land on
behalf of and in trust for their subjects in accordance with customary
law and usage. Although a number of state institutions are mandated
to regulate the management of customary land – for instance, through
land use planning and land title registration – in reality, they do not
act as a check upon the management of land by traditional leaders,
who have more or less free reign to act as they please (Ubink and
Quan 2008).
In many African countries the administrative functions of chiefs over-
lap with those of elected local government structures, for instance, in
the field of management of natural resources, including land, and of
provision of basic services to the communities. Research shows that
elected local government can form a serious threat to traditional autho-
rities. For example, when people in Ghana were asked what they con-
sidered the main function of the chief, they mentioned seven main
tasks. But when these same people were asked who they considered to
be the most appropriate actor to perform five of these tasks, it is strik-
ing that for all these tasks the chief was only considered the third or
fourth most appropriate actor, behind the Unit Committee – the lowest
level of elected local government – and the local representative of the
District Assembly – the second lowest level of elected local government
in Ghana (Ubink 2008). African governments have developed a num-
ber of different policies to regulate the relationship between elected lo-
cal government and traditional leadership. A typology of such policies
is presented in box 7.
Box 7: A typology of government policies concerning traditional
leadership
1. The policy of exclusion: This policy, which is usually legitimated by re-
presenting traditional authorities as being backward, aims to abolish
traditional authorities or at least folklorise their position and annihilat-
ing their role in local government. This policy has mostly been imple-
mented by countries with a revolutionary orientation, such as Guinea
in 1958 and Mozambique after the 1975 independence.
ð
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2. The policy of adaptation and re-orientation: This policy proceeds by
re-interpreting the functions of traditional leaders or by re-orienting
them towards political or developmental ends. Sometimes this entails
merely using the name of a traditional institution for a completely
new purpose. Usually, this does not include a role for traditional lea-
ders in local government.
3. The policy of integration: Traditional authorities are integrated into
the government administration and recognised as the only legitimate
local administrators. For instance, in Cameroon, canton and village
chiefs are up to the present day the only representatives of state
powers in rural areas below the level of districts (sub-prefectures) and
they continue to be chosen from among the members of traditional
local power lineages.
4. The policy of subordination: This policy refers to a situation where
the government officially recognises traditional authorities, but makes
them subordinate and answerable to the elected local authority or-
gans. Namibia provides the clearest example of this policy. Section 12
(2) of Namibia’s Traditional Authorities Act, 17 of 1995, states that in
the case of a conflict between traditional authority and a local author-
ity council, the powers of the local authority shall prevail.
5. The policy of association. The government officially recognises tradi-
tional leaders alongside new, modern, democratically elected and de-
centralised ones, and gives them official consultative or executive
functions associated with elected local government in the field of the
local political and development activities. Ghana is an important ex-
ample of this policy, where chiefs have constantly been associated
with local government activities, either in a consultative role or with
some executive powers.
6. The policy of harmonisation. This policy is a somewhat extremer
form of the policy of association. It acknowledges that whereas tradi-
tional and elected structures have distinctive and specialised roles
which require their separate existence, they also have common roles
and objectives which must be reconciled. In areas of common inter-
est, institutions should be created that involve all the role players, so
that the decisions made by the ‘harmonised’ institutions will be bind-
ing for all concerned. Thus, traditional authorities are represented in
the local council and can argue their point of view there. Its decisions
will then be binding for all concerned. Similarly, a specialised land al-
location body would have representation from traditional leaders,
elected councils and other interested parties, and its decisions would
be binding for all concerned.
ð
22 JANINE UBINK
7. The policy of ‘informal’ strategy or laissez-faire. The government re-
fuses to define official roles for traditional leaders in local government
but does not interfere in their activities as long as their activities do
not breach the law. An illustrative case is Uganda where the govern-
ment of Museveni has authorised the re-establishment of the tradi-
tional kingdoms, but has not given the traditional leaders any execu-
tive or consultative role. They exist only for traditional matters and are
not permitted to interfere in the activities of local decentralised insti-
tutions that are in charge of local government activities.
Source: Based on Bako-Arifari 1999: 5-15 and Hlatshwayo 1998.
Question 3: What role do traditional authorities play in national politics?
Sub-questions: What linkages exist between chiefs and modern state struc-
tures? Are they allowed to take part in party politics, and if so what role
do they play in this field?
There are many forms of linkages and formal institutional arrange-
ments between traditional authorities and modern state structures
throughout Africa. Associations of chiefs set up to defend the interests
of their members have also become increasingly numerous across the
continent. These cases include the national associations of traditional
authorities in Niger and Togo, which are considered important political
structures and are consulted by their governments in the formulation
of national policies. The ‘resurgence of chiefs as a class’ (Englebert
2002: 55-6) is frequently embodied in the creation of national or regio-
nal Councils or Houses of Traditional Leaders. For instance, in Botswa-
na, a House of Chiefs forms the advisory, upper chamber of the coun-
try’s bicameral parliament. The House of Chiefs has no legislative or
veto powers but acts as an advisory body to parliament and govern-
ment. All bills affecting tribal organisation and property, customary
law, and the administration of customary courts should go through the
House of Chiefs before being discussed. In Ghana, the National House
of Chiefs functions as an independent institution to advise the govern-
ment on traditional matters. The president of the National House of
Chiefs also has a seat on the Council of State, an advisory body to the
President, Ministers of State, Parliament and other public institutions,
which the President is required to consult when appointing high-rank-
ing public servants such as the Chief Justice, Ambassadors, etc.
Many African countries either have laws in place or very strong sen-
timents against allowing traditional leaders to combine traditional and
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active political leadership roles. This has two motives: 1) to prevent tra-
ditional leaders from abusing their positions to unfair political advan-
tage, and 2) to prevent factitious political divisions along ethnic lines,
which are likely to occur if traditional leaders are given free reign in
party politics. But because national politics excluding traditional leaders
also does not have a good track record on this last point in Africa, this
argument seems an excuse for politicians to keep traditional leaders
out of their way. Nevertheless, it is a valid argument that a politicisa-
tion of the chiefs’ role can seriously endanger the respect and regard
given to the traditional leaders. For instance, in Togo, during the re-
gime of President Eyadema, the chief came to be seen as part of his op-
pressive system of political control (Ray and Van Rouveroy van Nieu-
waal 1996: 32). It should be born in mind, however, that such a politi-
cisation can also occur when governments have a decisive say in the
recognition or installation of chiefs, and use this power to install chiefs
from a certain political denomination. Table 1 shows the approaches of
four southern African countries to the issue of access of traditional lea-
ders to political office.
“A politicisation of the chiefs’ role can seriously endanger the
respect and regard given to the traditional leaders.”
When chiefs have no official role in party politics, this does not mean
they are politically impotent. In the decades after independence, chiefs
in many countries have functioned as vote banks or vote brokers.
Although it is currently being questioned ‘whether the ‘customary
authorities’ have retained sufficient prestige to function as vote banks’
(Geschiere 1993: 151), politicians are still influenced by the fear or hope
that chiefs might be able to bring votes to certain political parties.
Table 1: Access of traditional leaders to political office
Can traditional leaders as traditional leaders be:
Country Party officers? Members of local
government council?
Members of
Parliament?
Botswana No
– must resign as
traditional leaders
first
Yes
– reserved place
cannot be elected
No
– must abdicate to
join National
Assembly
– can be members of
House of Chiefs
(Second Chamber -
advisory role only)
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Can traditional leaders as traditional leaders be:
Country Party officers? Members of local
government council?
Members of
Parliament?
Namibia No
– must resign first
– cannot combine
traditional office
with party political
office
No
– must resign first
– cannot combine
traditional office
with political office
No
– must resign first
– Council of
Traditional Leaders
(only advises in
land matters) not
yet in place
Zimbabwe Yes
– no restriction
Yes
– elected in own
right
– appointed as
special-interest
representatives
Yes
– elected in own
right
– appointed into ten
reserved seats for
chiefs in National
Assembly
Zambia Yes
– but ruling party
strongly against it
No
– no provision reser-
ving place of chiefs
– plans to include
chiefs’ representa-
tive council
Yes
– through elections
– House of Chiefs
(Second Chamber -
advisory)
– Abolished 1991
Source: d’Engelbronner-Kolff et al. 1998: 148.
4.2 The position of traditional leaders vis-a`-vis their people
Question 4: What is the legal and administrative position of traditional
authorities in their community?
Sub-questions: Which tasks do traditional leaders perform in their locality,
and how are these carried out? What kind of traditional checks and bal-
ances exist regarding the functioning of traditional leaders?
Traditional leaders perform a variety of functions, including dispute
settlement and ensuring peace in the community, management of nat-
ural resources such as land and water, local development projects, orga-
nising communal labour, mobilising the people for certain activities,
and traditional religious tasks. The institution of chieftaincy is charac-
terised by an ambivalence, where it needs to mediate between the past
and the present by propagating the image of itself as a ‘symbol of tradi-
tion’ while, at the same time, striving to serve as an agency for ‘modern
projects’ (Fisiy 1995: 49). This forces chiefs to operate on two distinct
fields, with different languages, but also enables them to mobilise a
wider variety of economic resources and politico-legal instruments of
power. Chiefs are nowadays selected on the basis of their education
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and profession – characteristics that should enable them to bring devel-
opment to their communities – but are at the same time expected to
act as guardians of tradition, creating a Janus-faced ruler. One can won-
der what effect the ‘modernisation of chieftaincy’ has on the traditional
and religious functions and prestige of traditional authority.
“The institution of chieftaincy is characterised by an
ambivalence, where it needs to mediate between the past
and the present by propagating the image of itself as a
‘symbol of tradition’ while, at the same time, striving to serve
as an agency for ‘modern projects’.”
The legal basis for chiefly tasks lies in customary law. This is an un-
written normative order that is regarded as somewhat flexible and ne-
gotiable. It is often said that chiefs – who are considered as authorities
in the field of customary law – have a very strong position to profit
from the flexibility of customary law. Formally, the performance of
chiefs is regulated by a number of customary checks and balances, in-
cluding the condition that chiefs rule in council with their elders or
subchiefs, and the sanction of deposition in case of serious misman-
agement or corruption. Research has shown, however, that these
checks and balances often do not function optimally in reality. As a re-
sult, traditional leaders have been able to rule arbitrarily and use their
position to enrich themselves, giving power considerations precedence
over the objectives of development. This can be witnessed especially in
areas where natural resources are very valuable and chiefs can profit
from their position as managers and caretakers of these natural re-
sources. This results in increased social differentiation within African
communities. Many have voiced their fear that laws and policies en-
hancing the position of chiefs will further exacerbate and elicit abuse
of power by unaccountable traditional authorities.
Question 5: What is the social position of traditional authorities in their
community?
Sub-questions: How do people feel about traditional authorities, and the
way they perform their functions? Do people accept the institution of tra-
ditional leadership as legitimate?
The integrity or corruption of chiefs is an important factor influencing
the legitimacy and popularity of chiefs in the locality. As said, this is
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especially a topic of interest in areas with high pressure on natural re-
sources. The self-enrichment of chiefs from the natural resources of
the community creates much tension and distrust in the communities.
But serious allegations of corruption and power hunger have been
launched against certain chiefs in other fields as well. One would ex-
pect that such cases would severely effect popular trust in chiefs’ local
leadership and their position as reliable intermediaries between the
people and either the state or the ancestors. There is very little re-
search, however, on how people feel about the chiefs, their performance,
and the institution of chieftaincy. Studies among the Sotho in South
Africa, and among the Ashantis in Ghana are positive exceptions to
this rule (Oomen 2002; Ubink 2008).
This lack of data does not hinder some academics and policymakers
from making assumptions about popular views on chieftaincy. For in-
stance, in South Africa, ‘assumptions abound concerning the extent
and nature of popular support for chieftaincy within the present demo-
cratic context. These assumptions are often striking in their simplicity,
and can be classified into two categories. The first is that people “con-
tinue to owe allegiance to the institution of traditional leadership”,
which is “deeply rooted in the social fabric of African communities”
and enjoys a cultural legitimacy. The second is as absolute, and holds
that traditional leaders in South Africa have lost all legitimacy because
of their involvement in the apartheid government’ (Oomen 2002: 182).
Among the Sotho, four spheres of justification that people refer to for
supporting chieftaincy can be distinguished. The first lies in the tradi-
tional and cultural character of the institution. The second refers to the
governmental recognition of chieftaincy. A third realm of justification
points to the performance of the institution. A last way to legitimate tra-
ditional leadership was by default, not because of the merits of the insti-
tution, but because of the lack of alternatives (Oomen 2002). Table 2
shows survey results in the areas Hoepakranz, Ga-Masha, and Mamone.
The support for chieftaincy among the Ashanti is not based on high sa-
tisfaction with the way chiefs perform their tasks. Instead, reasons can
be found in the realms of culture and identity (Ubink 2008).
Table 2: Why do people support traditional leaders?
Reasons for wanting to retain
traditional leadership
Hoepakranz
(N = 133)
Ga-Masha
(N = 100)
Mamone
(N = 121)
All
( N = 598)
Culture, Tradition 10% 28% 36% 24%
Link with Government 22% 32% 11% 23%
Their performance 18% 21% 35% 27%
Default 50% 19% 18% 26%
Source: Oomen 2002: 203.
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A distinction should be made between the legitimacy of individual
chiefs and the institution of chieftaincy. This distinction is often ig-
nored in the literature. Ray (2003: 5), for instance, states that ‘tradi-
tional leaders/chiefs can claim special legitimacy in the eyes of their
people because these institutions can be seen to embody their people’s
history, culture, laws and values, religion, and even remnants of pre-co-
lonial sovereignty’. Among the Sotho, there is an exceptionally high
correlation between how they rate their traditional leader and their rat-
ing of traditional leadership. Interestingly, the way Ashantis feel about
their chief seems not to influence their opinion on the institution of
chieftaincy (Oomen 2002; Ubink 2008). This dissimilarity between
the Ashantis and the Sotho matches with the fact that the institution
of chieftaincy is highly debated in contemporary South Africa, whereas
it is almost a fact of nature in Ghana. In the Ashanti Region, dissatis-
faction with local land administration and anger towards a particular
chief seldom seem to lead to discussions of the desirability of the insti-
tution of chieftaincy. For the majority, chieftaincy is a fact. The Ghana
case shows that people can simultaneously support the institution of
chieftaincy and be highly critical of the performance of certain chiefs
or certain tasks. Where governments consider recognising chieftaincy
or enhancing their position, policymakers should therefore ‘critically
assess chiefly rule – and popular perceptions of it – in various fields,
taking into account the performance of other actors in these fields, in-
cluding local government representatives’ (Ubink 2008: 160).
“A distinction should be made between the legitimacy of
individual chiefs and the institution of chieftaincy.”
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5 Traditional Governance in an Era
of Democratisation
The resurgence of traditional authority coincides with the wave of de-
mocratisation that has spread across sub-Saharan Africa since the
1990s. Many question the desirability and legitimacy of traditional
authority in modern forms of governance, and the compatibility of tra-
ditional rule with the principles of democratic rule of law. Aspects of
good governance such as social inclusion of some groups or the divi-
sion of power will be difficult to meet by traditional authorities. Tradi-
tional leaders often combine certain executive, legislative and judicial
powers, and thus do not conform to the principle of the separation of
powers. The democratisation discourse, predicated on the principle of
elective representation, strikes at the heart of traditional leadership
which is structured on the hereditary devolution of power.
“Many question the desirability and legitimacy of traditional
authority in modern forms of governance, and the
compatibility of traditional rule with the principles of
democratic rule of law.”
One has to argue for a specific ‘African form of democracy’ to be able
to reconcile hereditary traditional leadership with the principles of de-
mocracy. Within the prevalent discourse and ‘political imaginary’ of de-
mocratisation, proponents of traditional authority present chiefs as ex-
ercising ‘authentic’ African forms of democratic governance, as the true
representatives of rural African communities, and as ‘culture cores’ on
which a genuine sense of nationhood could be built. These justifica-
tions for enhancing the position of traditional leaders speak to dis-
courses on cultural diversity, pluralism, democracy, and participation.
Especially the concept of community is being used in order to provide
a democratic ring to the state’s use of traditional leaders in governance
(Kyed and Buur 2007).
Critics, however, question whether traditional leaders genuinely act
in accordance with the interests of their communities and whether tra-
ditional rule truly enhances popular participation in decision making.
Traditional governance does not allow for the right of citizens to elect
their representatives freely and according to their own choice. Where
universal suffrage in modern democratic states in theory guarantees in-
clusiveness, the position of the traditional leader is not subject to a de-
mocratic selection process. This is further compounded by the patriar-
chal nature of traditional leadership, which is usually not socially, eth-
nically, or gender inclusive. Additionally, youth often have limited
possibilities to be elected or selected as traditional leaders. Leadership
is often reserved for male elderly members of one ethnic group and ex-
cludes all others. Although used as if they were representative of the lo-
cal communities, chiefs often may not represent the whole community.
They are also not necessarily popular public figures. Traditional leaders
are also not always downwardly accountable to the local populations.
Accountability is the idea that poor performance of decision makers
can be sanctioned against. This requires mechanisms to penalise poor
performance. A necessary condition to keep authorities accountable is
the existence of sufficient transparency. The actions and decisions of
traditional leaders are usually less transparent than those of govern-
mental leaders in democratic countries. As the position of traditional
leader is usually inherited for life, the option of voting out leaders
whose performance was disapproved of does not exist. However, the le-
gitimacy and – to a certain extent – the power of traditional leaders
does depend on popular support. Greater accountability can be
achieved by establishing participatory approaches actively involving the
respective communities. In sum, critics fear that traditional rule will
compromise the gains promised by democracy with regard to equity,
human rights, and gender equality.
The above shows that we cannot take it for granted that traditional
leaders act in accordance with the interests of their communities and
that traditional rule enhances genuine popular participation in decision
making. The fact that in some instances the recognition of traditional
authorities has challenged local elected governments, and has been
used to bolster the monopoly of the ruling party or to justify the deci-
sion not to expand locally elected governments to rural areas, further
questions the compatibility of traditional rule with the principles of de-
mocracy (Kyed and Buur 2007: 9).
If mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness cannot be intro-
duced, the risk of corruption and abuse of power by traditional authori-
ties is too high to justify an extension of their role. The question of ac-
countability towards the local population becomes more important with
a growing amount of resources involved. On the one hand, accountabil-
ity could be enhanced by integrating traditional leadership in govern-
ment bureaucracy, on the other hand such a move could also have the
opposite effect. When such an integration goes together with ‘an un-
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holy alliance between the ruling party and the chiefs’, attempts to hold
chiefs accountable will be perceived as a challenge to the state and
party bureaucracy, and will therefore be fiercely resisted by the bureau-
cracy and the political party in power (Mapedza 2007: 202). Account-
ability mechanisms to force malfunctioning chiefs out of office are also
seriously undermined when the state has the final say in chiefly ap-
pointments and dismissals.
“When debating the desirability of formalising and
strengthening traditional governance, the performance of
traditional authorities needs to be compared with the reality
of local government in developing countries, not with how
local governments are supposed to work in theory.”
Let us end with a last, important caveat in this discussion. When debat-
ing the desirability of formalising and strengthening traditional govern-
ance, the performance of traditional authorities needs to be compared
with the reality of local government in developing countries, not with
how local governments are supposed to work in theory. The function-
ing of elected local governments is often flawed with major problems
of accountability, mismanagement, and capacity. These flaws need to
be taken into account when comparing the consequences of elected lo-
cal government and traditional leadership.
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